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Abstract
We show that the capacity region of the broadcast chan-
nel with confidential messages does not change when the
strong security criterion is adopted instead of the weak
security criterion traditionally used. We also show a con-
struction method of coding for the broadcast channel with
confidential messages by using an arbitrary given coding
for the broadcast channel with degraded message sets.
1 Introduction
The information theoretic security attracts much attention
recently [19], because it offers security that does not de-
pend on a conjectured difficulty of some computational
problem. A classical problem in the information theoretic
security is the broadcast channel with confidential mes-
sages (hereafter abbreviated as BCC) first considered by
Csiszár and Körner [11], in which there is a single sender
called Alice and two receivers called Bob and Eve. The
problem in [11] is a generalization of the wiretap chan-
nel considered by Wyner [24]. In the formulation in [11],
Alice has a common messages destined for both Bob and
Eve and a private message destined solely for Bob. The
word “confidential” means that Alice wants to prevent
Eve from knowing much about the private message. The
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coding in this situation has two goals, namely error cor-
rection and secrecy.
The traditional criterion of judging the secrecy is the
so-called weak security criterion, which requires that the
mutual information divided by the code length between
the secret message and the adversary’s information con-
verges to zero as the code length goes to the infinity.
Suppose that the secret message S n and the adversary’s
message Zn of length n have the identical part of length
n/ log n and that the rests are statistically independent,
then the weak security criterion judges this situation as
secure, while the adversary knows infinitely much infor-
mation on the secret message. This example suggests that
the weak security criterion is inappropriate for some ap-
plications.
To exclude such an insecure situation, Maurer [21] in-
troduced the strong security criterion, which requires the
mutual information converges to zero without division by
the code length. It is important to study the capacities
and the capacity regions of various information theoreti-
cal problems under the strong security criterion. The key
agreement problem [10, 16, 22] and the wiretap channels
[3, 10, 14, 16] have been studied under the strong security
criterion. However, the capacity region for the BCC has
not been clarified as far as the authors’ knowledge, be-
cause the strong security results in [3, 10, 14, 16] for the
wiretap channels do not seem to easily generalize to the
BCCs. Note that [22] cannot be used to prove the strong
security of transmission of secret messages, and that [3]
is an adaptation of [22] to the wiretap channels. We shall
clarify that the capacity region under the strong security
criterion is the same as that under the weak one. Our proof
argument just attaches inverses of hash functions to an
existing random coding argument for the broadcast chan-
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nel with degraded message sets (hereafter abbreviated as
BCD). Thus the analysis of decoding error probability in
our proof automatically becomes as good as the best anal-
ysis for BCD. The idea of attaching inverses of hash func-
tions seems first appeared in Csiszár [10] in the context of
information theoretic security.
On the other hand, in a communication system with
single sender and single receiver, the source coding and
the channel coding are the most classical and fundamen-
tal problems. The famous source-channel separation the-
orem [9, Section 7.13] states that we can get an opti-
mal source-channel joint coding by combining an opti-
mal source coding and an optimal channel coding, at least
in the sense of asymptotic information rate. Therefore,
it is natural to ask if there is a similar separation theo-
rem between secrecy coding and error correction coding
in the information theoretic security. In this direction, re-
cently Csiszár and Narayan [12, Lemma B.2] and Renner
[23, Lemma 6.4.1] implicitly proved the separation theo-
rem between secrecy coding and error correction coding
in the key agreement problem considered by Maurer [20]
and Ahlswede-Csiszár [1], which is also a classical and
fundamental problem in the information theoretic secu-
rity. Specifically, Csiszár, Narayan, and Renner showed
that the optimal key rate can be attained for the model
SW in [1] with one-way public communication provided
that we are given optimal probability distributions of the
auxiliary random variables in the key capacity formula,
by combining Slepian-Wolf encoder and decoder for er-
ror correction and a family of two-universal hash func-
tions (fully random functions in [12]) for secrecy. How-
ever, the separation in other problems does not seem to be
explored, as far as the authors know.
Although our argument for the capacity region of BCC
in Section 3 separates the analysis of the decoding error
probability and the mutual information, it does not sep-
arate the construction of a code for error correction and
provision of secrecy. In Section 4 we introduce another
form of the privacy amplification theorem so that we can
separate the code constructions for error correction and
secrecy, then we clarify which rate pairs can be achieved
by our separated code construction.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews
relevant research results used in this paper. Section 3
proves the capacity region under the strong security crite-
rion is the same as under the weak one. Section 4 presents
a computational procedure of an upper bound on the mu-
tual information when inverses of hash functions are at-
tached to an arbitrary given code for BCD. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Broadcast channels with confidential
messages
Let Alice, Bob, and Eve be as defined in Section 1. X de-
notes the channel input alphabet and Y (resp. Z) denotes
the channel output alphabet to Bob (resp. Eve). We as-
sume that X, Y, and Z are finite unless otherwise stated.
We shall discuss the continuous channel briefly in Re-
marks 12 and 14. We denote the conditional probability
of the channel to Bob (resp. Eve) by PY |X (resp. PZ|X). The
set Sn denotes that of the private message andEn does that
of the common message when the block coding of length
n is used. We shall define the achievability of a rate triple
(R1, Re, R0), where R1 is the rate of the secret message,
Re is the so-called equivocation rate [11], and R0 is the
rate of the common message. For the notational conve-
nience, we fix the base of logarithm, including one used
in entropy and mutual information, to the base of natural
logarithm. Privacy amplification theorems reviewed later
are sensitive to choice of the base of logarithm.
Definition 1 The rate triple (R1, Re, R0) is said to be
achievable if there exists a sequence of Alice’s stochas-
tic encoder fn from Sn × En to Xn, Bob’s deterministic
decoder ϕn : Yn → Sn × En and Eve’s deterministic de-
coder ψn : Zn → En such that
lim
n→∞
Pr[(S n, En) , ϕn(Yn) or En , ψn(Zn)] = 0,
lim inf
n→∞
H(S n|Zn)
n
≥ Re,
lim inf
n→∞
log |Sn|
n
≥ R1,
lim inf
n→∞
log |En|
n
≥ R0,
where S n and En represent the secret and the common
message, respectively, have the uniform distribution on
Sn and En, respectively, and Yn and Zn are the received
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signal by Bob and Eve, respectively, with the transmitted
signal fn(S n, En) and the channel transition probabilities
PY |X , PZ|X . The capacity region of the BCC is the closure
of the achievable rate triples.
Theorem 2 [11] The capacity region for the BCC is
given by the set of R0, R1 and Re such that there exists
a Markov chain U → V → X → YZ and
R1 + R0 ≤ I(V; Y |U) + min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
R0 ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
Re ≤ I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U),
Re ≤ R1.
As described in [19], U can be regarded as the com-
mon message, V the combination of the common and the
private messages, and X the transmitted signal.
If we set Re = R1 then we have limn→∞ I(S n; Zn)/n = 0,
which is traditionally called perfect security, because Eve
knows little about S n. However, Maurer [21] and Csiszár
[10] observed that limn→∞ I(S n; Zn) = 0 is a better cri-
terion for the secrecy of S n from Eve, and this stronger
requirement is called the strong security criterion, while
the traditional one is called the weak security criterion re-
cently.
Corollary 3 [11] The notation is same as Theorem 2. If
we require Re = R1, the capacity region for (R0, R1) is
given by the set of R0 and R1 such that there exists a
Markov chain U → V → X → YZ and
R0 ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
R1 ≤ I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U).
2.2 Broadcast channels with degraded mes-
sage sets
If we set Re = 0 in the BCC, the secrecy requirement is
removed from BCC, and the coding problem is equiva-
lent to the broadcast channel with degraded message sets
(abbreviated as BCD) considered by Körner and Marton
[18].
Corollary 4 The capacity region of the BCD is given by
the set of R0 and R′1 such that there exists a Markov chain
U → V = X → YZ and
R0 ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
R0 + R′1 ≤ I(V; Y |U) + min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)].
Throughout this paper, the information rate of the private
message to Bob without secrecy requirement is denoted
by R′1 instead of R1, to emphasize the difference. One
of several typical proofs for the direct part of BCD is as
follows [5]: Given PUV , R0, R′1, we randomly choose
exp(nR0) codewords of length n according to PnU , and
for each created codeword un, randomly choose exp(nR′1)
codewords of length n according to PnV |U(·|un). Over the
constructed ensemble of codebooks, we calculate the av-
erage decoding probability by the joint typical decoding,
or the maximum likelihood decoding, etc.
2.3 Privacy amplification theorem
We shall use a family of two-universal hash functions [8]
and a privacy amplification theorem obtained by Hayashi
[16] based on the work by Bennett et al. [4]. So we shall
review them.
Definition 5 Let F be a set of functions from S1 to S2,
and F the not necessarily uniform random variable on F .
If for any x1 , x2 ∈ S1 we have
Pr[F(x1) = F(x2)] ≤ 1
|S2|
,
then F is said to be a family of two-universal hash func-
tions.
Proposition 6 Let L be a random variable with a finite
alphabetL and Z any random variable. Let F be a family
of two-universal hash functions from L to M, and F be
a random variable on F statistically independent of L.
Then
I(F(L); Z|F) ≤ 1
ρ
|M|ρE[PL|Z(L|Z)ρ] (1)
for 0 < ρ ≤ 1. If Z is not discrete RV, I(F(L); Z|F) is
defined to be H(F(L)|F) − EzH(F(L)|F, Z = z).
In addition to the above assumptions, when L is uni-
formly distributed, we have
1
ρ
|M|ρE[PL|Z(L|Z)ρ] =
|M|ρE[PL|Z(L|Z)ρPL(L)−ρ]
|L|ρρ
. (2)
In addition to all of the above assumptions, when Z is a
discrete random variable, we have
|M|ρE[PL|Z(L|Z)ρPL(L)−ρ]
|L|ρρ
3
=
|M|ρ
|L|ρρ
∑
z
∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)PZ|L(z|ℓ)1+ρPZ(z)−ρ. (3)
Remark 7 It was assumed that Z was discrete in [16].
However, when the alphabet of L is finite, there is no dif-
ficulty to extend the original result.
As in [16] we introduce the following two functions.
Definition 8
ψ(ρ, PZ|L, PL) = log
∑
z
∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)PZ|L(z|ℓ)1+ρPZ(z)−ρ,(4)
φ(ρ, PZ|L, PL) = log
∑
z
∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)(PZ|L(z|ℓ)1/(1−ρ))

1−ρ
.(5)
Observe that φ is essentially Gallager’s function E0 [13].
Proposition 9 [13, 16] exp(φ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)) is concave
with respect to PL with fixed 0 < ρ < 1 and PZ|L. For
fixed 0 < ρ < 1, PL and PZ|L we have
exp(ψ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)) ≤ exp(φ(ρ, PZ|L, PL)). (6)
3 Calculation of the average mutual
information with random coding
In this section we shall prove that the capacity region
given in Corollary 3 is also the capacity region of the
BCC under the strong security criterion. We do not need
the proof for the converse part. We shall prove the direct
part. Let the RV Bn on Bn denote the private message to
Bob without secrecy requirement, En on En the common
message to both Bob and Eve, Fn on Fn a function in a
family Fn of two-universal hash functions from Bn to Sn,
Λ an RV indicating selection of codebook in the random
ensemble constructed in the way reviewed in Section 2.2,
Un = Λ(En) on Un and Vn = Λ(Bn, En) on Vn codewords
for the BCD taking the random selectionΛ taking into ac-
count, and Zn Eve’s received signal, where n denotes the
code length. We assume that for every fn ∈ Fn is surjec-
tive and for all s ∈ Sn the set {b ∈ Bn | fn(b) = s} has the
constant number of elements. Such requirement on fn is
satisfied, for example, when Fn is the set of all surjective
linear maps from Bn to Sn.
The structure of the transmitter and the receiver is as
follows: Fix a hash function fn ∈ Fn and Alice and Bob
agree on the choice of fn. Given a secret message sn,
choose bn uniformly randomly from {b ∈ Bn | fn(b) = sn},
treat bn as the private message to Bob, encode bn along
with the common message en by an encoder for the BCD,
and get a codeword vn. Apply the artificial noise to vn
according to the conditional probability distribution PnX |V
and get the transmitted signal xn. Bob decodes the re-
ceived signal and get bn, then apply fn to bn to get sn. This
construction requires Alice and Bob to agree on the choice
of fn. We shall show that I(S n; Zn|Fn) = E fn I(S n; Zn|Fn =
fn) to be arbitrary small. This ensures that most choice
of fn makes I(S n; Zn|Fn = fn) small. The same argument
was also used in [10].
Let S n denote the RV of the secret message. Define
B′n to be the RV uniformly chosen from the random set
{b ∈ Bn | Fn(b) = S n}. We want to apply the privacy
amplification theorem to I(Fn(B′n); Zn|Fn). To use the the-
orem (Proposition 6) we must ensure independence1 of Fn
and B′n. The independence is satisfied by the assumptions
on Fn if S n is uniformly distributed. In that case B′n is uni-
formly distributed overBn. Denote B′n by Bn. The remain-
ing task is to find an upper bound on I(Fn(Bn); Zn|Fn,Λ).
Since the decoding error probability of the above scheme
is not greater than that of the code for BCD, we do not
have to analyze the decoding error probability.
Firstly, we consider I(Fn(Bn); Zn|Fn,Λ) with fixed se-
lection λ of Λ. In the following analysis, we do not make
any assumption on the probability distribution of En ex-
cept that S n, En, Fn and Λ are statistically independent.
I(Fn(Bn); Zn|Fn,Λ = λ)
≤ I(Fn(Bn); Zn, En|Fn,Λ = λ)
= I(Fn(Bn); En|Fn,Λ = λ)︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
=0
+I(Fn(Bn); Zn|Fn, En,Λ = λ)
=
∑
e
PEn (e)I(Fn(Bn); Zn|Fn, En = e,Λ = λ) (7)
≤
∑
e
PEn (e)
exp(nρR1)
ρ exp(nρR′1)
∑
b,z
PBn(b)
PZn |Bn,En,Λ=λ(z|b, e)1+ρPZn |En=e,Λ=λ(z)−ρ (by Eqs. (1–3))
1The statistical independence of the corresponding random variables
in [3, 10] was not discussed in detail.
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=
∑
e
PEn (e)
exp(nρR1)
ρ exp(nρ(R′1))
∑
v,z
∑
b:λ(b,e)=v
PBn(b)
︸            ︷︷            ︸
=PVn |En=e,Λ=λ (v)
PZn |Bn,En ,Λ=λ(z|b, e)1+ρ︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
=PZn |Vn ,Λ=λ(z|v)1+ρ
PZn |En=e,Λ=λ(z)−ρ
=
∑
e
PEn (e)
exp(nρR1)
ρ exp(nρ(R′1))
∑
v,z
PVn |En=e,Λ=λ(v)
PZn |Vn,Λ=λ(z|v)1+ρPZn |En=e,Λ=λ(z)−ρ
=
∑
e
PEn (e)
exp(nρR1 + ψ(ρ, PZn|Vn,Λ=λ, PVn|En=e,Λ=λ))
ρ exp(nρ(R′1))
=
∑
e
PEn (e)
exp(nρR1 + ψ(ρ, PZn|Vn , PVn|En=e,Λ=λ))
ρ exp(nρ(R′1))
=
∑
e
PEn (e)
exp(nρ(R1 − R′1) + ψ(ρ, PZn |Vn , PVn|En=e,Λ=λ))
ρ
.
(8)
We shall average the above upper bound over Λ.
∑
e
PEn (e)I(Fn(Bn); Zn|Fn,Λ, En = e)
≤
∑
λ
PΛ(λ)
∑
e
PEn (e)
exp(nρ(R1 − R′1) + ψ(ρ, PZn |Vn , PVn|En=e,Λ=λ))
ρ
=
∑
λ
PΛ(λ)
∑
e
PEn (e)
exp(nρ(R1 − R′1) + ψ(ρ, PZn |Vn , PVn|Un=λ(e),Λ=λ))
ρ
=
∑
λ
PΛ(λ)
∑
u
PUn |Λ=λ(u)
exp(nρ(R1 − R′1) + ψ(ρ, PZn |Vn , PVn|Un=u,Λ=λ))
ρ
=
∑
u
PUn (u)
∑
λ
PΛ|Un=u(λ)
exp(nρ(R1 − R′1) + ψ(ρ, PZn |Vn , PVn|Un=u,Λ=λ))
ρ
≤
∑
u
PUn (u)
∑
λ
PΛ|Un=u(λ)
exp(nρ(R1 − R′1) + φ(ρ, PZn|Vn , PVn|Un=u,Λ=λ))
ρ
(by Eq. (6))
≤
1
ρ
∑
u
PUn (u) exp
[
nρ(R1 − R′1)
+φ
(
ρ, PZn |Vn ,
∑
λ
PΛ|Un=u(λ)PVn|Un=u,Λ=λ
)]
(concavity of exp(φ) is used) (9)
=
1
ρ
∑
un∈Un
PUn (un) exp[nρ(R1 − R′1)
+φ(ρ, PZn|Vn , PVn|Un=un )]
=
1
ρ
∑
un∈Un
n∏
i=1
PU(ui) exp[ρ(R1 − R′1)
+φ(ρ, PZ|V , PV |U=ui )]
=
1
ρ
n∏
i=1
∑
ui∈U
PU(ui) exp[ρ(R1 − R′1)
+φ(ρ, PZ|V , PV |U=ui )]
=
1
ρ
[
exp(ρ(R1 − R′1))∑
u∈U
PU(u) exp(φ(ρ, PZ|V , PV |U=u))
]n
. (10)
We shall consider under what condition the upper
bound goes to zero. Taking the logarithm of the upper
bound (10) we have
− logρ + nρ
[
R1 − R′1 +
1
ρ
log
(∑
u∈U
PU(u) exp(φ(ρ, PZ|V , PV |U=u))
)
︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
(∗)
]
.
We can see that (*) → I(V; Z|U) as ρ → 0. by applying
the l’Hôpital’s rule to (*).
This shows that the amount R′1 − R1 of random
garbage required to make S n = Fn(Bn) secret from
Eve is I(V; Z|U) per channel use. By choosing R0 =
min{I(U; Y), I(U; Z)}− δ and R′1 = I(V; Y |U)− δ, we have
completed the direct part proof.
Remark 10 Our proof does not require the common mes-
sage En to be decoded by Bob. Our technique can provide
an upper bound on the mutual information of S n = Fn(Bn)
even when En is a private message to Eve.
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Remark 11 The (negative) exponential decreasing rate
of the mutual information in our argument is
ρ
[
R1 − R′1 +
1
ρ
log
(∑
u∈U
PU(u) exp(φ(ρ, PZ|V , PV |U=u))
)]
Minimizing the above expression over 0 < ρ ≤ 1, R′1 and
U → V → X → YZ such that R0 ≤ min{I(U; Y), I(U; Z)},
and R′1 ≤ I(V; Y |U) gives the smallest negative exponent.
From the form of the mathematical expression, increase
in R′1 decreases the mutual information and increases the
decoding error probability of the secret message to Bob.
This suggests that the optimal mutual information and the
optimal decoding error probability cannot be realized si-
multaneously.
Remark 12 We can easily carry over our proof to the
case of the channel being Gaussian, because
• we can extend Eq. (3) to the Gaussian case just by
replacing the probability mass functions PZ|L and PZ
by their probability density functions.
• the random codebook Λ obeys the multidimensional
Gaussian distribution,
• the concavity of φ is retained when its second argu-
ment is conditional probability density,
• and the all mathematical manipulations in this sec-
tion remains valid when U, V, Z, Λ are continu-
ous and their probability mass functions are replaced
with probability density functions, while Bn, En, Fn
remain to be discrete RVs on finite alphabets.
4 Separated code construction for
the broadcast channel with confi-
dential messages
Suppose that we are given single triple of an encoder
and decoders for BCD. We want to construct a code for
BCC based on the code for BCD, by attaching the in-
verse of a randomly chosen two-universal hash function
to the given BCD code. If we could do this without loss of
any optimality, then the practical study of codes for BCC
would become unnecessary, because the study of practi-
cal BCC codes can be reduced to that of practical BCD
codes. We stress that the random choice of encoder and
decoder is widely accepted as a practical method, see e.g.,
[7, 15, 23].
Let X be the uniform distribution on the given code-
book, and Z Eve’s received signal given X as channel in-
put. By simply applying Proposition 6 to X and Z, the size
of secret message set S has to satisfy
min
0<ρ≤1
|S|ρE[PX |Z(X|Z)ρ]
ρ
≤ acceptable value. (11)
When the number of codewords is, say 21000, evaluation
of the left hand side is practically impossible.
We shall introduce another form of the privacy amplifi-
cation theorem alternative to Proposition 6 whose compu-
tation as Eq. (11) is intractable with arbitrary given single
BCD encoder, so that we can compute a suitable size of
S. What follows is an extension of a result on the wiretap
channel [17]. The following theorem is an adaptation of
the channel resolvability lemma [14, Lemma 2].
Theorem 13 Assume that the given family of two-
universal hash function F from L to M satisfies that
|F−1(m)| = |L|
|M|
, ∀m,
the statistically independent random variable K and L
obey the uniform distributions on K and L, respectively,
and a fixed conditional probability QZ|K,L is given. We
also assume that F is statistically independent of K and
L. Then,
I(F(L); Z|F) ≤ |M|
ρ exp(φ(ρ, QZ|K,L, PK,L))
(|K| × |L|)ρρ ,
for 0 < ρ < 1.
Proof.
I(F(L); Z|F)
≤ I(F(L); K, Z|F)
= I(F(L); Z|K, F)
≤
∑
k
PK(k) |M|
ρ
|L|ρρ
exp(ψ(ρ, PZ|K=k,L, PL))
6
(by Eqs. (1–3))
≤
∑
k
PK(k) |M|
ρ
|L|ρρ
exp(φ(ρ, PZ|K=k,L, PL)) (by Eq. (6))
=
∑
k
PK(k)PK(k)ρ−1︸            ︷︷            ︸
=|K|−ρ
|M|ρ
|L|ρρ
∑
z∑
ℓ
PK(k)PL(ℓ)(PZ|K,L(z|k, ℓ)1/(1−ρ))

1−ρ
=
|M|ρ
|K × L|ρρ
∑
z

∑
k,ℓ
PK,L(k, ℓ)(PZ|K,L(z|k, ℓ)1/(1−ρ))

1−ρ
=
|M|ρ
|K × L|ρρ
exp(φ(ρ, PZ|K,L, PK,L)).
Suppose that we are given a triple of an encoder and
decoders for the BCD. We shall derive a computable up-
per bound on the mutual information between the secret
message and Eve’s received signal. Let S n be the secret
message to Bob, En be the common message to both Bob
and Eve. We assume that S n and En are uniformly dis-
tributed and that they are statistically independent to each
other. Let Fn be an RV on a family Fn of two-universal
hash functions. Fn is statistically independent of (S n, En),
and we use the same assumptions on the hash functions
as Section 3. Let Bn be the uniform random on the set
{b ∈ Bn | Fn(b) = S n}. As in Section 3, Bn and Fn are sta-
tistically independent and we can apply the privacy am-
plification theorem. Let Zn be Eve’s received signal after
encoding Bn by the given encoder en for BCD, applying
the artificial noise PnX |V , and transmitting the resulted sig-
nal over the given channel. By using Theorem 13, we
have
I(Fn(Bn); Zn|Fn) ≤
|Sn|
ρ exp(φ(ρ, PnZ|V , Pen(Bn,En)))
|Bn × En|ρρ
. (12)
Recall that the function φ is essentially Gallager’s func-
tion E0 [13], and we have
exp(φ(ρ, PnZ|V , Pen(Bn,En)))
≤ max
Pn on Vn
exp(φ(ρ, PnZ|V , Pn))
= max
P1 on V1
exp(nφ(ρ, PnZ|V , P1))︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
(∗∗)
(by [2]). (13)
Because (**) is concave with respect to P1 [13], its maxi-
mization can be computed in practice, for example by [6].
On the other hand, minP1 (**) is convex with respect to ρ,
so its minimization with respect to ρ can also be computed
by the bisection method [6].
We have to investigate under which conditions the
above computational procedure for the secret message
size can achieve a rate pair (R0, R1). The logarithm of
the right hand side of Eq. (12) is
ρ
(
log |Sn| − log |Bn| − log |En| +
nφ(ρ, PZ|V , P1)
ρ
)
− log ρ.
Since φ is essentially E0 in [13], limρ→0 φ(s, PZ|V , PV)/ρ =
I(V; Z). Therefore, if log |Sn| < log |Bn| + log |En| −
n(maxPV I(V; Z) + δ) for all n, then I(S n; Zn|Fn) goes to
zero as n → ∞. This means that if (R0, R′1) is achievable
as a rate pair in the BCD defined by PYZ|V by adjusting the
artificial noise PX |V and R1 ≤ R0+R′1−maxPV I(V; Z) then
the rate pair (R0, R1) is achievable by our computational
procedure for an upper bound on the mutual information.
When we use Theorem 13 in place of Proposition 6 in
Section 3, we can prove an achievable rate pair (R0, R1) to
be achievable by Theorem 13 only if R0 is close to I(U; Z).
We cannot prove the achievability of a rate pair (R0, R1)
by Theorem 13 if R0 ≃ I(U; Y) < I(U; Z).
Remark 14 As Remark 12, the generalization of results
in Section 4 to the Gaussian channels is easy provided that
the transmitted signal is chosen from a fixed finite subset
of R for every channel use. When the transmitted signal
is chosen from varying finite sets for each channel use, we
have difficulty in Eq. (13).
5 Conclusion
We argued that the weak security criterion, which requires
only the mutual information divided by the code length
converges to zero, may be inappropriate in some appli-
cations, by explicitly providing an insecure example, and
made a case for the strong security criterion introduced by
Maurer [21], which requires the mutual information con-
verges to zero without division by the code length. The
broadcast channel with confidential messages [11] is one
of fundamental problems in the information theoretical
security [19], but its capacity region remained unknown
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under the strong security criterion before this paper. We
have shown that the capacity region under the strong se-
curity is the same as that under the weak one.
On the other hand, the separation between secrecy cod-
ing and error correction coding is important from both
theoretical and practical viewpoints. We presented a ran-
dom coding argument and a code construction that sep-
arate error correction and secrecy. However, our separa-
tions for the broadcast channel with confidential messages
are still incomplete compared to the source channel sep-
aration [9, Section 7.13] or the separation in the classical
[12, 23] and quantum [23] key agreement problem, be-
cause we cannot separately and independently construct
codes for secrecy and error correction and combine them
without losing the optimality in the sense of asymptotic
information rate, as done in [9, Section 7.13] and [12, 23].
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